

4. I make this affidavit under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5. On March 16, 2018, each of the above-captioned Debtors except New York Network Management, LLC (“**NYNM**”) filed a voluntary petition for relief with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “**Bankruptcy Court**”) under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. NYNM filed its voluntary petition on July 5, 2018. The Debtors’ cases were jointly administered for administrative purposes only.

6. On February 26, 2019, the Honorable Alan S. Trust, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of New York, entered an order [Docket No. 701] confirming the Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation (the “**Plan**”).

7. The Plan provides, among other things, for the formation of a Liquidating Trust and the appointment of a Liquidating Trustee to oversee distributions to holders of “Allowed Claims” and “Allowed Interests” and to pursue retained “Causes of Action of the Debtors’ Estates”. The Effective Date occurred on March 1, 2019.

8. The Plan provides that the Liquidating Trustee shall have the authority and responsibility to, among other things, receive, manage, invest, supervise, and protect the “Liquidating Trust Assets”, including causes of action.

9. Plaintiff is the Liquidating Trustee under the Liquidating Trust Agreement by and among Orion HealthCorp, Inc. (“**Orion**”), Constellation Healthcare Technologies, Inc. (“**Constellation Healthcare**”) and their co-debtor affiliates.

10. Niknim is a corporation formed under the laws of the State of New York with its principal address at 27 Kettlepond Road, Jericho, New York.

11. Plaintiff filed the complaint (the “**Complaint**”) in this action on March 13, 2020. [Dkt. No. 1].

12. The Complaint seeks to recover alleged intentional and constructively fraudulent transfers under applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and New York Debtor and Creditor Law (“**NYDCL**”).

13. On May 21, 2021, the parties filed the Stipulation and Order re: Filing of First Amended Complaint; And Entering of Scheduling Order [Dkt. No. 19], which was entered by the Court on May 26, 2021. [Dkt. No. 20].

14. On May 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint for Avoidance and Recovery of (1) Fraudulent Transfers; (2) Preferential Transfers; (3) Recovery of Avoided Transfers, and (4) Objection to Claim No. 10067 Pursuant to 11U.S.C. §§502, 544, 547, 548, and 550. [Dkt. No. 22].

15. On June 9, 2021, Defendants filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses. [Dkt. No. 23].

16. On September 21, 2021, the parties filed the Stipulation Requesting Amendment to Case Management and Discovery Plan [Dkt. No. 26], which was entered by the Court on October 5, 2021. [Dkt. No. 27].

17. On December 30, 2021, fact discovery closed.

18. The parties participated in mediation but did not reach a resolution. [Dkt. No. 41].

19. Expert discovery closed on October 10, 2022. [Dkt. No. 41].

20. Pursuant to 7056-1(a), Plaintiff requested the Court’s permission to file a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. [Dkt. No. 45]. At the pre-trial conference, the Court heard and granted Plaintiff’s request.

21. At the pre-trial conference, Defendants requested the Court's permission to file a cross motion for summary judgment and the Court heard and granted such request.

22. The parties filed their respective motions, and the Court adjudicated them by (i) granting, as to the First Transfer (defined below), the Plaintiff's motion against only Niknim, with respect to the First Cause of Action to avoid it as an intentionally fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§544 and 548(a)(1)(A) and N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law §276, and his Second Cause of Action to avoid it as a constructively fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §544 and N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law §§272-275, and §273-a, in each case because it found that the Debtors received no value in exchange for the First Transfer and (ii) denying Defendants' cross motion, finding the Plaintiff indeed has standing to bring claims under 11 U.S.C. §§544.

23. The Court also directed the parties to again participate in mediation; however, the mediation was not successful.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

24. In or about 2015 and earlier, I was the majority owner and Chief Executive Officer of Porteck Corporation ("**Porteck**").

25. In or about March 2015, the Debtor, Physicians Practice Plus, LLC ("**Physicians Practice**"), acquired the assets of Porteck pursuant to an asset purchase agreement made and entered into as of March 2015 (the "**Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement**").

26. In or about June 2017, Physicians Healthcare Network Management Solutions LLC ("**Physicians Healthcare**"), a non-debtor, acquired my membership interests in Objectech Holdings, LLC pursuant to a Membership Interests Purchase Agreement made and entered into as of June 2017 (the "**Objectech Membership Purchase Agreement**").

The Transfers

27. On or about June 23, 2017, within one (1) year prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy cases, Constellation Healthcare made two payments to Niknim; one for \$1,500,000 and another for \$20,000 (collectively, the “**One-Year Transfers**”), representing the Closing Payment pursuant to the terms of the Objectech Membership Purchase Agreement.

28. On or about April 15, 2016, within two (2) years prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy cases, Constellation Healthcare and/or Orion paid Niknim \$2,500,000 (the “**Two-Year Transfer**”) (collectively, the One-Year Transfers and the Two-Year Transfer are referred to as the “**Transfers**”).

29. Plaintiff has produced no evidence as to the identity of the transferor of the Two-Year Transfer; he merely alleges funds were transferred from the Debtors’ counsel’s IOLA account, into which Constellation Healthcare and/or Orion made deposits.

First Claim for Relief

30. Plaintiff alleges the Transfers are avoidable as intentionally fraudulent transfers pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and NYDCL section 276. As mentioned, the Court has granted summary judgment against only Niknim as to the One-Year Transfers.

Second Claim for Relief

31. Plaintiff alleges that the Transfers were avoidable as constructively fraudulent pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and the NYDCL. The Court has granted summary judgment on this claim against only Niknim as to the One-Year Transfers.

Third Claim for Relief

32. Plaintiff alleges that the One-Year Transfers were preferential, avoidable under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Fourth Claim for Relief

33. Plaintiff alleges that because Defendants are the initial, immediate, or mediate transferees of the Transfers, Plaintiff may recover for the benefit of the estate the property transferred or the value of such property from (a) the initial transferee of each transfer or the entity for whose benefit each transfer was made or (b) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee pursuant to section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and NYDCL. The Court has granted summary judgment against only Niknim as to the One-Year Transfers. The Court did not grant summary judgment against me as Niknim's alleged alter ego.

Fifth Claim for Relief

34. Finally, Plaintiff seeks to (i) strike my proof of claim because it was not filed with evidentiary support and is contradicted by the Debtors' books and records, or alternatively, (ii) disallow the claim pursuant to section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code unless and until I pay to the Plaintiff an amount equal to each preferential or fraudulent transfer that is avoided including pre- and post-judgment interest on the avoided amount.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

35. Plaintiff now seeks judgment against Niknim on his First and Second Claims for Relief with respect to the Two-Year Transfer and as to both Transfers, seeks judgment on his Fourth Claim for Relief against me as Niknim's alter ego. Plaintiff also seeks judgment against me on his Third and Fifth Claims for Relief, seeking to avoid the Transfers as preferential and disallow my claim, respectively.

36. Plaintiff's First and Second Claims for Relief (for fraudulent conveyance) are predicated upon both section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and the NYDCL.

The Two-Year Transfer

37. I believe the Porteck transaction was legitimate. However, based upon Plaintiff's prior submissions, I believe Plaintiff intends to raise irrelevant and unsubstantiated

arguments and red herrings in an attempt to prove it was a fraudulent conveyance, which it was not. For example, Plaintiff will make much of the fact that Parmar characterized Porteck as a “joke”. However, the statement is taken out of context and its meaning is ordained by Plaintiff without any evidentiary support. Regardless, the statement is irrelevant because the Plaintiff is not attacking the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement itself as a fraudulent conveyance, he is attacking the deferred payment made under it.

38. Parmar’s comment was made to the broker I had obtained to represent Porteck. It was a manifestation of Parmar’s (appropriate) attempt to negotiate with the broker a lesser price for Porteck’s assets than I was asking. I previously testified in this litigation that Parmar misstated the purchase price to the broker because Parmar thought “he could get a better deal for us.” Parmar made the comment on December 1, 2014, three months prior to the March 2015 execution of the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement and almost one and one-half years before the Two-Year Transfer of April 15, 2016. Regardless, only Parmar, whose testimonial evidence Plaintiff has not obtained, knows exactly what he meant. Here, Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than a self-serving guess, which is wrong.

39. Parmar and I ultimately agreed that the value of Porteck’s assets was approximately five times its 2014 EBITDA of \$2.2 million, or \$11 million. (The stated purchase price was \$10.8 million.) Having bought and sold many companies during my career, I know that a purchase price based upon this multiple of EBITDA is not unusual. The inference Plaintiff draws from Parmar’s comment - that the purchase price exceeded the reasonable value of the assets, is a bridge too far.

40. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff will also make much of the fact that Porteck, as seller under the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement, received \$10.8 million, although the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement provides for a purchase price of \$12.8 million. At the time,

Parmar asked that the purchase price be increased by \$2 million to fund related deal fees because he wanted to pay the fees out of the proceeds of sale instead of paying them as a separate expense. He wanted the purchase price to reflect the total cost of the transaction. I did not believe there was anything unusual about this. Regardless, the issue is not relevant because, as mentioned, Plaintiff is not attacking the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement itself as a fraudulent conveyance, he is attacking the deferred payment made under it.

41. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff will note that according to the IOLA Account, \$3 million of the purchase price was paid to First United Health (“FUH”), a Parmar controlled entity, and he assumes that it was inappropriate. And he will assume that I had knowledge at the time that it was inappropriate. I had no such knowledge. Nor was I ever privy to information regarding the IOLA Account. I had no knowledge of any disbursement of closing proceeds other than with respect to the payments made to Porteck. Indeed, I did not learn until this litigation that funds were paid to FUH. Here too, the inference Plaintiff draws - that I was complicit in a fraudulent transaction - is a bridge too far. Regardless, here too, the issue is not relevant because, as mentioned, Plaintiff is not attacking the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement itself as a fraudulent conveyance, he is attacking the deferred payment made under it.

42. Plaintiff’s arguments directed at the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement are a red herring. Plaintiff is not challenging the price or the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement itself as a fraudulent conveyance. Nor is he seeking to recover the Two-Year Transfer under a theory that it was paid as some mistake - a breach of the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement to be corrected through recovery; he is challenging only the Two-Year Transfer as a fraudulent conveyance, which was in fact a deferred payment made pursuant to the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement a year after it was executed.

43. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement, Porteck, as seller, made certain representations and warranties. Pursuant to Article 4, the selling shareholders also made certain representations and warranties. Pursuant to Article 7, Porteck and the selling shareholders jointly and severally agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Physicians Practice and certain of its affiliates against claims arising from breaches of, among other things, such representations and warranties.

44. Section 1.6(e) of the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement, which incorporated a funding mechanism to secure the performance by the selling shareholders of their indemnification obligation, provides:

“For the purpose of partially securing Seller’s obligations pursuant, and without limiting Seller’s obligations thereunder, the amount of two million five hundred thousand Dollars (\$2,500,000) in cash (the “**Escrow Amount**”) shall be delivered by Buyers [sic] at the Closing to the Escrow Agent by wire transfer of immediately available funds to an account (the “**Escrow Account**”) to be designated and administered by the Escrow Agent pursuant to an escrow agreement substantially in the form of Exhibit A (the “**Escrow Agreement**”), which Escrow Agreement shall provide, among other things, that any amounts remaining in the Escrow Account shall be released to Seller twelve (12) months after the Closing, to the extent not subject to any claims made prior to that time. Seller and Buyer agree that for all Tax purposes, any amounts in the Escrow Account released to the Seller pursuant to this Section 2.7 [sic] shall be treated as additional purchase price, unless otherwise required by applicable Law. The Escrow Payment Working Capital Deficiency [sic].”

45. The stated purpose of the escrow arrangement was to protect the rights of Physicians Practice, as purchaser under the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement, to receive \$2.5 million, to the extent such funds were required to indemnify Physicians Practice. But as a practical matter, the arrangement was not necessary to protect Physicians Practice because it simply withheld payment of the \$2.5 million. The arrangement provided more meaningful benefit to the sellers because it would have secured their rights to obtain such funds in the future to the extent

the funds were not required to fund their indemnity obligation. No indemnity claims arose entitling the purchaser to any such funds, and I therefore asked that the sellers be paid the entire amount. Constellation Healthcare and/or Orion paid Niknim \$2,500,000; i.e., the Two-Year Transfer.

46. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff intends to argue that the failure of the Debtors to create the escrow compels the conclusion that Porteck was not entitled to the deferred payment and that the Two-Year Transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. However, as a feature that would have served to enhance the sellers' rights to receive the deferred payment, Porteck's failure to enforce the provision at closing was an oversight that was averse to the seller's interests alone. I did not learn until this litigation that the escrow was not created, and I never claimed that funds were otherwise set aside to fund the deferred payment. As an officer of Orion and Constellation Healthcare, I was confident that the deferred payment would be made if required. In any event, the absence of the escrow does not militate in favor of the conclusion that the payment was not due or that it was a fraudulent conveyance.

47. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff will argue that at December 31, 2015, the Debtors' books did not reflect an antecedent debt of \$2.5 million owed to the sellers of Porteck and their books evidence no satisfaction of an antecedent debt or increase in net assets as a result of making the Two-Year Transfer. But this is of no moment. I had nothing to do with maintaining the Debtors' books and records. More importantly, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that either of such entries would have been appropriate under the circumstances. These are just facts from which Plaintiff draws an unsupported inference.

48. I believe Plaintiff will point to Parmar's email to me saying that "I am willing to give you 3.5MM in return for you to allow me to structure it properly internally which requires I close the file with a 2M payment." The \$3.5 million related to a discussion I had been having with Parmar regarding the \$2.5 million owed as a deferred payment under the Porteck Asset

Purchase Agreement, plus \$1 million that the purchaser owed Porteck because it had collected that amount of accounts receivable, which had not been sold under the Porteck Asset Purchase Agreement. Plaintiff's interpretation of the email is a self-serving misinterpretation that does not support a grant of judgment.

49. Plaintiff will likely mention that during my tenure as an officer of Orion and Constellation Healthcare, the latter purportedly acquired MDRX Medical Billing, LLC (“**MDRX**”) and its businesses for \$28 million on February 10, 2016, and that MDRX was a sham transaction. Here again, from this single fact, Plaintiff would have this Court draw the inference that I participated with Parmar in this transaction. In fact, despite my status as an officer of Orion and Constellation Healthcare, I had nothing to do with it.

Judgment Against Walia

50. Plaintiff alleges that “As Defendants are the initial, immediate or mediate transferee of the Transfers, Plaintiff is entitled to receive for the Estate the proceeds or value of the Transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and NY Debt & Cred L.” *See* First Amended Complaint at paragraph 43.

51. Niknim is the initial transferee of the Transfers. Plaintiff alleges that

there existed a unity of interest in ownership between Defendant, Walia and Defendant, Niknim such that the individuality and separateness between them ceased and that Defendant, Niknim is the alter ego of Defendant, Walia in that, among other things: (a) Defendant Walia controlled, dominated, managed and operated Defendant Niknim as his alter ego; (b) Defendant Walia makes all decisions pertaining to Defendant Niknim; (c) there has been a failure to comply with or observe the formalities of corporate formation and/or operation; (d) Defendant Niknim was inadequately capitalized; and (e) that the individuality of said entity should be disregarded pursuant to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

See First Amended Complaint at paragraph 4.

52. My status as an initial transferee depends upon Plaintiff proving that Niknim is my alter ego. I understand that in New York, in order to state a claim for alter-ego liability, plaintiff is generally required to allege “complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked” and “that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff’s injury.” Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support such allegations and I submit there is none.

53. Assuming, arguendo, that I completely dominated Niknim, I committed no fraud or wrong against the Debtors which resulted in their injury. And I believe any argument the Plaintiff may make that my management of the financial affairs of Niknim in and of itself constituted the “fraud or wrong,” aside from not being true, was waived by the Debtors, in whose steps the Plaintiff stands as Trustee.

54. The Debtors waived the argument because they always knew exactly what Niknim was – an entity through which I generally consulted and here specifically provided consulting services to the Debtors as a component of my overall compensation – and knew that Niknim, as my corporate consulting vehicle, would never have a strong balance sheet showing sufficient solvency to return any transfer made to it.

55. As to my status as an immediate or mediate transferee of the Transfers, Plaintiff has made no allegation with respect to any transfer by Niknim. Regardless, assuming I was a transferee of Niknim, my liability would be shielded under section 550(b)(1) because I took for value. I was entitled to revenue received by Niknim in exchange for my consulting services. Moreover, I took such revenue in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the Transfers.

CONCLUSION

56. In view of the foregoing, I respectfully submit that Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden for obtaining judgment on the claims as to which the Court has not granted summary judgment.

Dated: _____, New York
July 10, 2024

/s/ Arvind Walia
Arvind Walia

State of Texas
County of Harris

On the 10th day of July, in the year 2024, before me, the undersigned, personally appeared Arvind Walia personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument, the individual executed the instrument.

/s/ Ana Laura Salazar Uribe

Ana Laura Salazar Uribe
Electronic Notary Public
State of Texas
Notary ID: 1317547026
Commission Exp. OCT 11, 2026

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